Base and Superstructure
Base and Superstructure
Essay
Base and Superstructure
Mechanical materialism and its aftermath
The answers given to these questions lead
to very different views about how society develops.
At the one extreme, there is the view that
the base is the forces of production, that they inevitably advance, and that this
in turn leads to changes in society.
Political and ideological struggle is then
seen as playing no real role. Human beings are products of their circumstances,
and history proceeds completely independently of their will. The outcome of wars,
revolutions, philosophical arguments or what-not is always determined in advance.
It would have made not one iota of difference to history if Robespierre had walked
under a carriage in 1788 or if the sealed train had crashed in April 1917.
This view of Marxism is based upon a certain
reading of Marx himself, in particular upon a powerful polemical passage in The
Poverty of Philosophy:
‘In acquiring new productive forces, men
change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in
changing their way of earning a living, they change all their social relations.
The handmill gives you society with a feudal lord; the steam mill society with an
industrial capitalist.’[1]
It is in the years after Marx’s death that
such a mechanical, determinist view of history comes to be regarded as ‘Marxist’
orthodoxy. It was during this period that Marxism came to hegemonise the German
workers’ movement, and through it the Second International. But it was Marxism as
seen through the eyes of Karl Kautsky, the ‘Pope of Marxism’.
For Kautsky, historical development had inevitably
produced each mode of production in turn – antiquity, feudalism, capitalism – and
would eventually lead to socialism. There was an ‘inevitable…adaptation of forms
of appropriation to forms of production’.[2] Revolutionary movements could not alter this pattern of development.
Thus the Hussites of the 15th century and the revolutionary Anabaptists of the
16th century had been able to fight courageously and to present the vision of a
new society; but, for Kautsky, they could not alter the inevitable development of
history:
‘The direction of social development does
not depend on the use of peaceful methods or violent struggles. It is determined
by the progress and needs of the methods of production. If the outcome of violent
revolutionary struggles does not correspond to the intentions of the revolutionary
combatants, this only signifies that these intentions stand in opposition to the
development of the needs of production.
Violent revolutionary struggles can never
determine the direction of social development, they can only in certain circumstances
accelerate their pace…’[3]
The task of revolutionary socialists under
modem capitalism was not to try to cut short the historical process, but simply
to reflect its development by carefully building up socialist organisation until
capitalism was ready to turn into socialism. But, at the same time, counter-revolutionaries
could not stop the onward march of the forces of production and, therefore, of
historical evolution. Kautsky insisted that ‘regression’ from more advanced to
more backward forces of production never occurred.[4] ‘Economic development’, said his most influential work, his introduction
to the German Social Democratic Party’s Erfurt Programme, ‘will lead inevitably
to the… conquest of the government in the interests of the [working] class’.[5]
Very close to Kautsky’s formulations were
those of the pioneer Russian Marxist, Plekhanov. He held that the development of
production automatically resulted in changes in the superstructure. There is no
way human endeavour can block the development of the forces of production. ‘Social
development’ is a ‘process expressing laws’.[6] ‘The final cause of the social relationships lies in the state of
the productive forces.’ ‘Productive forces… determine… social relations, i.e. economic
relations’.[7]
He provides a ‘formula’ which sets out a
hierarchy of causation in history. The ‘state of the productive forces’ determines
the ‘economic relations’ of society. A ‘socio-political system’ then develops on
this ‘economic basis’. ‘The mentality of men living in society [is] determined in
part directly by the economic conditions obtaining and in part by the entire socio-political
system that has arisen on that foundation.’ Finally, the ‘various ideologies …
reflect the properties of that mentality’.[8]
He would assert that ‘history is made by
men’, but then go on to insist that ‘the average axis of mankind’s intellectual
development’ runs ‘parallel to that of its economic development’, so that in the
end all that really matters is the economic development.[9]
The outcome of great historical events like
the French Revolution did not depend at all on the role played by individuals like
Mirabeau or Robespierre:
‘No matter what the qualities of a given
individual may be, they cannot eliminate the given economic relations if the latter
conform to the given state of the productive forces.
Talented people can change only individual
features of events, not their general trend.’[10]
Just as Kautsky’s interpretation of Marxism
dominated in the parties of the Second International, Plekhanov’s was taken up as
the orthodoxy by the Stalinist parties from the late 1920s onwards.[11] In the
hands of Stalin and his ‘theoreticians’ it became an unbendable historical law:
development of the forces of production inevitably led to corresponding changes
in society, so the growth of industry in Russia would inevitably lead from a ‘workers’
state’ to ‘socialism’ and from ‘socialism’ to ‘communism’, regardless of the misery
and hardship involved; by contrast, the clearest indication that Western capitalism
had outlived its lifespan was the decline in its forces of production.
The reaction against determinism
Stalinist Marxism did not long outlast
Stalin himself. The ‘new left’ of the late 1950s and the Maoist left of the mid-1960s
both launched assaults on the crude mechanical determinist account of history.
They insisted, rightly, that in Marx’s own
historical writings – the Class Struggles in France, The 18th Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte, The Civil War in France – there is not a hint of a passive, fatalistic
approach to historical change. They also laid great emphasis on certain remarks
Engels had made in a series of letters he wrote at the very end of his life, in
the 1890s, criticising an over-crude use of historical materialism. Engels had
written to Starkenburg:
‘Political, juridical, philosophical, religious,
literary, artistic, etc development is based on economic development. But these
all react on one another and also upon the economic basis. It is not that the economic
situation is cause, solely active, while everything else is only passive effect.
There is rather interaction on the basis of economic necessity which ultimately
always asserts itself.’[12]
And to Bloch:
‘According to the materialist conception
of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and
reproduction of real life. More than that neither Marx nor I have ever asserted.
Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only
determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless abstract senseless
phrase.
The economic situation is the basis, but
the various elements of the superstructure – political forms of the class struggle
and its results, to wit: constitutions established by victorious classes after a
successful battle, etc, juridical forms and even the reflexes of these actual
struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical
theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas
– also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and
in many cases preponderate in determining their form…
There is an interaction of all these elements
in which, amid all the endless host of accidents, the economic element finally asserts
itself as necessary.’[13]
The post-1956 new left went on to argue
that even the terms ‘base and superstructure’ were simply a metaphor, not to be
taken too seriously. The ‘reciprocal’ influence of the superstructure on the base
meant that ‘determination’ was not to be seen as a strict causal relationship.
The Maoist left did not begin with such an
explicit break with the past. The doyen of this school, Louis Althusser, was quite
willing in his early 1960s writings to quote Stalin himself favourably.
But the Althusserians created a new theoretical
structure which destroyed most of the content of the old notions of ‘base’, ‘superstructure’
and ‘determination’. Society consisted of a number of different structures – the
political, the economic, the ideological, the linguistic – each developing at its
own speed, and having an impact on the others. At any particular point in history
it could be any one of them that dominated the others. It was only ‘in the last
instance’ that the economic was ‘determinant’.
The new left and the Maoist-Althusserian
schools were initially very hostile to each other.[14]
Yet both of them redefined historical materialism in a way that
opened the door to a great dose of voluntarism.
For the 1950s new left, this meant moving
away from any tight definition of class or any real concern with how social being
might affect social consciousness. In the writings about current events by the
most prominent British new left figure, E P Thompson – right through from his
1960 essay ‘Revolution’[15] to his anti cruise missile writings of 1980 – there is the insistent
message that energy and goodwill and a repudiation of tight categories can be enough
in themselves to open the road to victory. In his more theoretical writings he
rejects the view that ‘economic’ factors play any sort of determining role in history,
or even that they can be separated out from other factors such as the ideological
or judicial.[16]
Althusser’s tone is different: in his earlier
writings the key to change is still a party of an essentially Stalinist sort. But
there is the same element of voluntarism as in Thompson: if only the party understands
the articulation of the different structures, it can force the pace of history,
regardless of ‘economic’ factors.
Most of his followers have abandoned any
notion of ‘determination’, even in ‘the last instance’, and have moved to positions
that deny any possibility of understanding how societies change. So, for instance,
one English post-Althusserian, Gareth Stedman Jones, now tells us that the only
way to understand any ideology is in its own terms and that you must not make any
attempt to interpret its development in terms of the material circumstances of
those who adhere to it.[17] We are right back to the old empiricist adage, ‘Everything is what it
is and nothing else.’ Such is the mouse that the elephantine structures of Althusserianism
have given birth to.
The convergence of the old new left and
the Althusserians has created a sort of ‘common sense’ among Marxists which holds
that any talk of base and superstructure is really old hat. So widespread has
the influence of this ‘common sense’ been that it has even affected people who
reject completely the political conclusions of Thompson or Althusser.[18]
The only concerted resistance to this tendency
has come from admirers of the orthodox analytical philosopher G A Cohen.[19] But his
defence of Marx involves a complete retreat to the mechanical interpretation of
Kautsky and Plekhanov.
The revolutionary materialist alternative
Historically, however, there has always
been a revolutionary alternative to either mechanical materialism or voluntarism.
It existed in part even in the heyday of Kautskyism in some of the writings of Engels
and in the work of the Italian Marxist, Labriola.[20]
But the need for a theoretical alternative
did not become more widely apparent until the years of the First World War and
the Russian Revolution proved the bankruptcy of Kautskyism. It was then that Lenin
reread Hegel and concluded, ‘Intelligent (dialectical) idealism is closer to intelligent
materialism than stupid (metaphysical) materialism’.[21]
In the years that followed, thinkers like
George Lukács, Karl Korsch and Antonio Gramsci all tried to provide versions
of historical materialism which did not see human activity as simply a passive
reflection of other factors. And in his magnificent History of the Russian Revolution,
Leon Trotsky provided an account of a world historical event which placed massive
emphasis on subjective as well as objective factors – and was criticised from a
Plekhanovite point of view for doing so.[22]
A non-mechanical, non-voluntarist version
of historical materialism is absolutely vital today. It can easily be found in
the works of Marx himself, if you supplement his classic account in the Preface
to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy with what he says at various
points in The German Ideology, The Poverty of Philosophy, The Communist Manifesto,
and elsewhere.
Production and society
Marx first sets out his account of historical
materialism in The German Ideology of 1846.
He starts from a materialist recognition
that human beings are biologically part of nature:
‘The premises from which we start are not
dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination.
They are real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which
they live, both those which they find existing and those which they produce by
their own activity.
The first fact to be established is the
physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relationship to
the rest of nature… The writing of history must always set out from these natural
bases and their modification in the course of history through the actions of men.
We must begin by stating the first real
premise of human existence, and therefore of all human history, the premise that
men must be able to live in order to ‘make history’. But life involves before everything
else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. .
[This is] a fundamental condition of all
human history which today as thousands of years ago must be daily and hourly fulfilled
merely in order to sustain human life.’[23]
So there is a core activity at any point
in history which is a precondition for everything else which happens. This is
the activity of work on the material world in order to get food, shelter and clothing.
The character of this activity depends upon
the concrete material situation in which human beings find themselves.
This determines the content of the most
basic forms of human action. And so it also determines what individuals themselves
are like.
‘The mode of production must not be considered
simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals.
Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of
expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part.
As individuals express their life so they
are. What they are therefore coincides with their production, both of what they
produce and how they produce.
The nature of individuals thus depends on
the material circumstances determining their production …’[24]
These passages cannot be properly understood
unless Marx’s central point about human activity – best expressed in the Theses
on Feuerbach (written at the same time as The German Ideology) – is understood.
For Marx humanity is part of nature. It arises as a product of biological evolution,
and one must never forget its physical dependence on the material world around it.
All of its institutions, ideas, dreams and ideals can only be understood as arising
from this material reality – even if the route through which they so arise is often
long and circuitous. As Labriola put it, ‘Ideas do not fall from heaven and nothing
comes to us in a dream’.[25]
But that does not mean humans are not qualitatively
distinct from the rest of nature. Like any other species, humanity has its own
defining features. For Marx the key such defining features are that human beings
have to react back upon the material circumstances in which they find themselves
in order to survive:
Men can be distinguished from animals by
consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They distinguish themselves
from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step
which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of
subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.[26]
Humans cannot act independently of their
circumstances. But this does not mean they can be reduced to them. They are continually
involved in ‘negating’ the material objective world around them, in reacting upon
it in such a way as to transform both it and themselves.
At each point in history, human beings have
to find some way to cope with the needs of material survival. How they cope is
not something independent from the objective physical world; rather it is a product
of that world. Yet it can never be grasped simply as a mechanical consequence of
the physical constitution of nature. It is not mechanical causality, but human action
which mediates between the world in which human beings find themselves and the
lives they lead.
Social production
Production is never individual production.
It is only the collective effort of human beings that enables them to get a livelihood
from the world around them.
So the central core activity – work – has
to be organised socially. Every particular stage in the development of human labour
demands certain sorts of social relationships to sustain it.
In The German Ideology Marx refers to the
social relations between people at any particular point in history as the ‘form
of intercourse’. And he insists that, ‘The form of intercourse is again determined
by production’.[27]
The various institutions that embody human
relationships can only be understood as developing out of this core productive interaction:
‘The fact is that definite individuals
who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and
political relations … The social structure and the state are continually evolving
out of the life processes of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as
they appear in their own or other people’s imaginations, but as they really are;
i.e. as they operate, produce materially and hence as they work under definite
material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.’[28]
In order to maintain their material lives,
human beings are forced to act on the world in certain ways – to engage in material
production. But that requires certain forms of cooperation between them.
These core relationships provide a framework
which everything else humans do has to fit on to. Everything else is, in this sense,
based on them. They provide the limits to what is possible in any society.
So, for instance, a hunter-gatherer society
does not have the means to store food for more than a few days, and can only survive
if its members are continually on the move looking for more foodstuffs. It is
therefore restricted in a number of ways: it cannot be made up of bands of more
than 20 or so people; the women in it cannot bear more than one child every four
or five years, since the children have to be carried when the band looks for food;
there is no means by which one section of society could be freed from labour in
order to engage in writing, reading, higher arithmetic, etc.
This is the narrowest way in which you can
grasp Marx’s argument. But he sees it as having even wider implications than this.
The relations of material production not only limit the rest of relations in society,
they are also the source of the content of these wider relations as well.
The history of society is the history of
changes in the ways in which production takes place, each associated with changes
in the relations between human beings immediately around the productive process.
And these changes in turn then exert a pressure on all the other social relations.
If, for instance, a band of hunter-gatherers
adopts a me of radically increasing the food available to them (by, say planting
root vegetables for themselves instead of having search for them) and of storing
food for long periods of time (for instance, in earthenware pots), this necessarily
changes their social relations with each other. Instead of continually moving,
they have to stay in one spot until the crop can be harvested; if they are staying
in one spot, there is no longer any necessity for restriction on the number of
children per woman the crop becomes something which other bands of people can seize,
so providing, for the first time, an incentive for warfare, between rival bands.
Changes in the way material production takes
place lead changes in the relations of society in general.
And even relations between people which
do not arise out production – the games people play with each other, the forms
sex takes, the relations of adults and young babies – will affected.
Marx does not at all deny the reality of
relations other than directly productive ones. Nor does he deny that they can influence
the way production itself takes place. As he puts it in Theories of Surplus Value:
‘All circumstances which… affect man, the
subject of production, have greater or lesser effect upon his functions and activities,
including his functions and activities as creator of material wealth, of commodities.
In this sense it can be truly asserted that all human relations and functions,
however and wherever they manifest themselves, influence material production and
have a more or less determining effect upon it.’[29]
This is even true in pre-class societies.
There is a tendency for old patterns of working and living to crystallise into
relatively inflexible structures. They become ‘sanctified’ with the development
of systems of religion, magic, taboos, rituals and so or At first these systems
are carried on even in ‘bad times’, when the short term needs or desires of the
individual might lead ti actions which ruin the long term interests of the social
collectivity. But, by this very fact, they discourage innovation and move to new
forms of production, which would be of long-term as well as short-term benefit.
Exploitation and the superstructure
Something more is needed than simple cooperation
between people for the forces of production to develop beyond a certain point. Exploitation
is also needed.
While the surplus left after the satisfaction
of everyone’s minimal needs is small, resources can only be gathered together for
further development of the forces of production if the surplus is controlled by
a small, privileged minority of society. Hence it is that wherever there is the
development of agriculture proper out of horticulture, the growth of trade, the
use of dams and canals for flood prevention and irrigation, the building of towns,
there are also the beginnings of a polarisation within society between those who
exploit and those who are exploited.
The new exploiting group has its origins
in its role in production: it is constituted out of those who were most efficient
in introducing new methods of agricultural production, or those who pioneered new
sorts of trade between one society and its neighbours, or those who could justify
themselves not engaging in backbreaking manual labour because of their ability
to foresee flood patterns or design waterworks. But from the beginning the new exploiting
group secures its control by means other than its role in production. It uses its
new wealth to wage war, so further enhancing its wealth through booty and the taking
of slaves. It establishes ‘special bodies of armed men’ to safeguard its old and
its new wealth against internal and external enemies. It gains control of religious
rites, ascribing the advance of the social productive force to its own ‘supernatural
powers’. It rewrites old codes of behaviour into new sets of legal rules that sanctify
its position.
The new exploiting group, in short, creates
a whole network of non-productive relations to safeguard the privileged position
it has gained for itself. It seeks through these political, judicial and religious
means to secure its own position. It creates a non-economic ‘superstructure’ to
safeguard the source of its own privileges in the economic ‘base’.
The very function of these ‘non-economic’
institutions means that they have enormous economic impact. They are concerned
with controlling the base, with fixing existing relations of exploitation, and
therefore in putting a limit on changes in the relations of production, even if
this also involves stopping further development of the productive forces.
In ancient China, for example, a ruling
class emerged on the basis of certain sorts of material production (agriculture
involving the use of hydraulic installations) and exploitation. Its members then
sought to preserve their position by creating political and ideological institutions.
But in doing so they created instruments that could be used to crush any new social
force that emerged out of changes in production (eg out of the growth of handicrafts
or trade). On occasions that meant physically destroying the new productive means.
So great is the reciprocal impact of the
‘superstructure’ on the base, that many of the categories we commonly think of as
‘economic’ are in fact constituted by both. So, for instance, ‘property rights’
are judicial (part of the superstructure) but regulate the way exploitation takes
place (part of the base).
The way the political and judicial feed
back into the economic is absolutely central to Marx’s whole approach. It is this
alone which enables him to talk of successive, distinct ‘modes of production’ –
stages in history in which the organisation of production and exploitation is
frozen in certain ways, each with its distinctive ruling class seeking to mould
the whole of society to fit in with its requirements.
Far from ignoring the impact of the ‘superstructure’
on the ‘base’, as many ignorant critics have claimed for more than a century, Marx
builds his whole account of human history around it.
Old relations of production act as fetters,
impeding the growth of new productive forces. How? Because of the activity of
the ‘superstructure’ in trying to stop new forms of production and exploitation
that challenge the monopoly of wealth and power of the old ruling class. Its laws
declare the new ways to be illegal. Its religious institutions denounce them as
immoral. Its police use torture against them. Its armies sack towns where they are
practised.
The massive political and ideological
struggles that arise as a result, decide, for Marx, whether a rising class, based
on new forces of production, displaces an old ruling class. And so it is an absolute
travesty of his views to claim that he ‘neglects’ the political or ideological element.
But the growth of superstructural institu